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 Most Western nations treat health policy (especially, but not only, issues of coverage) as 
a national responsibility in which subnational governments or regions may be granted a more or 
less prominent role. The United States, by contrast, has never adopted a national health policy, 
nor agreed that it ought to do so. In consequence the 50 states have played three roles: partners 
with the feds in some very important programs (for instance Medicaid and the State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program), sources of pressure on Washington for a redivision of labor in health 
affairs, and sources of innovation in health policy in default of national leadership.  
This role trilogy was a potent political force in the run-up to the Clinton health reform 
plan of 1993-94. In the late 1980s, state spending on Medicaid shot up for several reasons, 
including the costs of treating people with AIDS/HIV, new federal coverage mandates, the 
states’ own Medicaid maximization strategies, the impact of general medical inflation, and a 
growing number of uninsured residents. The administration of President George H.W. Bush was 
disinclined toward bold national measures, and a cadre of states resolved to install systems that 
would achieve or approach universal coverage and contain costs, mainly via managed care, to 
boot. In 1988 Massachusetts passed legislation that aimed at universal coverage via a play or pay 
approach. Oregon’s famous rationing plan (aka “prioritization”) earmarked savings imputed to 
the elimination of insufficiently cost effective services in Medicaid for an expansion of 
eligibility in that program. In legislation of 1993 Washington State coupled an employer 
mandate with managed competition. Other states—New York, California, Colorado, Vermont, 
and Florida, for example—deliberated at length on reform but after various and sundry detours 
came up short. These real and attempted innovations boosted the conviction that health reform 
was not only imperative but also at long last doable and thereby pushed reform higher on the 
national agenda. When Bill Clinton prominently advertised his commitment to health reform in 
his successful presidential campaign of 1992, few doubted that the idea’s time had finally come. 
By 1994 national reform and most of the states’ handwork were dead. Massachusetts 
deferred implementation of its plan and then repealed most of it. Oregon added about 100,000 
residents to Medicaid and then, failing to find big savings by rationing or otherwise, struggled 
with the program’s costs. Washington State gutted most of its 1993 reform bill in 1995.To be 
sure, not all was lost. Minnesota, for instance, quietly layered federal and state programs without 
employer mandates or managed competition and brought its rate of uninsurance below 10 
percent. The enactment of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in 
1996 gave the federal government a larger role in regulating private health insurance, which 
heretofore had been left largely to the states. The creation of SCHIP in 1997 put “catalytic  
federalism” ( Brown and Sparer,2001) on display: drawing both on Medicaid and on innovative 
programs of child coverage  in states such as New York, Massachusetts, and Florida, the feds 
designed a new template that entailed new funding and challenges for the 50 states.  On the 
whole, however, misadventures at both levels of government reaffirmed a sour truth that would-
be leaders denied at their peril: health reform initiatives tend to generate much more antagonism 
among threatened interest groups (especially business, providers, and insurers) than gratitude 
within the electorate and are therefore a poor investment of political capital. For a decade 
thereafter the reform “movement” fell mute while states fine tuned their “partner” role in 
Medicaid waivers, the implementation of SCHIP, and other variations on incrementalist themes.  
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Around 2005, however, history began to repeat itself. The national number of uninsured, 
rising by roughly one million per year, hit 45 million. As in the late 1980s, relentless media 
attention to the issue powerfully intimated that the status quo was doomed. Meanwhile, growth 
in Medicaid and SCHIP had lowered the number of uninsured children by about five million. By 
enacting a program to cover all its children, Illinois showed that state health reform was astir 
again, and Maine and Vermont passed laws that aimed at universal coverage. For a time the 
media mostly recorded lagging enrollment in Maine’s plan, but then the eyes of reformers 
everywhere were drawn to Massachusetts which, Rip Van Winkle-like, rose to reprise the quest 
for reform that had gone awry a decade earlier.  
Even as the exogenous shock of soaring Medicaid spending had galvanized states in the 
late 1980s, the proverbial prospect of being hanged the next day by waiver-meisters in the 
federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services concentrated the minds of Massachusetts’s 
leaders on how best to meet Washington’s conditions for renewing roughly half a billion dollars 
in waiver funds, namely, that the state spend less on the safety net and more on coverage for the 
uninsured. In 2006 Massachusetts passed legislation that combined an individual mandate (all 
residents are legally obliged to buy “affordable” coverage if it is available), very modest 
financial penalties for employers who fail to offer coverage, expansion of Medicaid, new 
income-related subsidies for those who do not qualify for Medicaid, and assorted administrative 
innovations that would help residents to find and enroll in affordable health plans. As before, 
New York State wondered if it should do something similar, and California too soon joined the 
(small) crowd. In 2008, as had been the case fifteen years earlier, innovations within the federal 
“laboratory” signaled to the American public and the presidential contenders seeking their votes 
that a plausible plan for national health reform was a precondition for political success. And 
now, as then, federalism is sometimes said to be a positive, perhaps indeed invaluable, element 
in the strategic design. (For example, then: Tallon and Nathan, 1992; now: Aaron and Butler, 
2004). 
 
Mandates, Medicaid, Models, and More 
States as stimuli to and models for federal policy are one thing; states as partners and 
participants in federal policies are another. Whereas the Clinton plan of 1993-94 gave the states a 
major role in organizing and overseeing regional health alliances (which vanished into oblivion 
with the rest of the blueprint), the main Democratic presidential contenders in 2008 are rather 
more laconic on federalism. (The main allusion to the states in Hillary Clinton’s plan allows 
them “the option of banding together” to offer regional versions of her Health Choices Menu. 
Barack Obama would permit “flexibility for state plans . . . provided they meet the minimum 
standards of the national plan.”) The state of the art of health reform on the Republican side, 
meanwhile, is pretty well captured by the repudiation by (failed) presidential aspirant Mitt 
Romney of the plan for universal coverage he had promoted while governor of Massachusetts.  
In the Clinton episode an employer mandate, regional health alliances, and managed 
competition were the centerpieces of a model that was expected to wed left and right, 
government and market, regulation and competition into an acceptable reform package. Today’s 
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model du jour features individual and employer mandates, expansion of Medicaid, new public 
subsidies geared to income, and savings from information technology, prevention, and much 
more on lists notable for the absence of managed care from center stage. Whereas the Clinton 
concoction came out of whole theoretical cloth, the latter-day stratagems derive from flesh and 
blood legislation that has already inspired emulation in important states and could conceivably 
become a serviceable national model. 
The generalizablity (upward to Washington or outward across the states) of this or other 
approaches probably turns less on analytical merit than on goodness of political fit. The 
Massachusetts plan is arguably highly context-dependent. The law of 2006 was not (merely) the 
product of superior political enlightenment but rather a response to a sharp stimulus—possible 
loss of sizable Medicaid funds in a waiver under renegotiation with the feds. The plan 
supposedly advanced the presidential fortunes of then-governor Romney. Massachusetts couples 
a high rate of private health care coverage with a generous Medicaid program, and therefore 
began the exercise with a relatively low percentage of uninsured residents. The state enjoys 
unusual cohesion and cooperation among health care sectors; this law, like the enactment of 
1988, brought hospitals, physicians, business groups, insurers, and academic medical centers 
together in sustained collaboration rarely found in other states. The continuing federal waiver 
money, plus new and reprogrammed public funds in a state sometimes caricatured as 
“Taxachusetts,” cemented a good financial deal for providers (mainly excepting the safety net, 
whose leaders complained that they won mainly a promise that they would eventually have new 
paying–insured–customers), for the business community (penalties for not covering workers cost 
less than buying insurance), and for insurers, who stood to gain new subsidized business. The 
Massachusetts case directly calls the federalism question: pondering how this or a similar 
approach might fare in other states, or in a national program in which all states were obliged to 
participate is a kind of litmus test of the prospects for success of the emerging reform project.  
Mississippi is not Massachusetts. States that lack the carrot/stick of big federal waivers 
on the line, do not have governors eager to use public program-building for the disadvantaged to 
appeal to a national audience, combine relatively low private-sector coverage with constricted 
Medicaid eligibility, suffer high rates of uninsurance, house providers, businesses, and insurers 
with little history of or inclination toward co-operation, and show little taste for crafting new 
income-related public subsidies for the less affluent may find the emerging reform template 
distasteful as federal or state policy. At the head of this class of presumed skeptics would be 
Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Florida, and Arizona (five states in which uninsurance rates run 
around or above 20 percent and that collectively contain about 40 percent of the U.S. uninsured), 
and the political economy and health policy tastes of most states probably lie closer to this 
quintet than to Minnesota, Massachusetts, Maine, and Vermont.  
A mandate that all residents of a state (or the nation) buy coverage could be a progressive 
coup or a regressive affliction—depending on whether Medicaid and public subsidies are 
generous enough to keep out of pocket payments tolerable. The weaker the requirements for 
employer participation, the longer the fiscal stretch for public programs. But the firmer the bite 
on employers, the greater the prospects of political opposition by powerful small (and some 
large) business lobbies. The broader the role of an expanded Medicaid, the bigger the tax burden 
to meet state shares of whatever intergovernmental matching formula might be adopted. (As 
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Nicole Kazee [2008] points out, 70 federal cents on the dollar is objectively a good deal but may 
not be so perceived by states accustomed to think of themselves as poor and fiscally 
beleaguered.) The smaller the role for enlarged Medicaid coverage, the greater the funds that 
must come from consumers and/or employers and/or new public subsidies that will probably 
mimic the fiscal politics of Medicaid expansions. Equity objectives go hand in hand with tax 
issues—the need for new taxes to sustain redistributive programs old and new, the case for 
repealing tax breaks, and so on—that roil the smooth surface of consensus.  
The reform approach on display in Massachusetts, and, mutatis mutandis, in the 
proposals of the leading Democratic presidential contenders is less a model than a laundry list of 
strategies tossed, Lego-like, onto health policy’s famous big round table. The five variables in 
question—individual mandates, employer requirements, Medicaid expansion, public subsidies, 
and “savings” from various and sundry sources—invite diverse outcomes that extend from fair 
and affordable universal coverage premised on newfound solidarity among Americans to a cruel 
charade that compels the less well-off to pay heavily out of pocket to buy costly coverage 
dubbed affordable by regulatory fiat or for coverage that is affordable but inadequate because 
insufficiently subsidized, with multiple mixed cases in-between. The new template reformulates 
the big health reform questions, but does not, per se, answer them. The devil, not yet in the 
details, haunts the design. 
In principle the elections of 2008 could launch a universal national health measure that 
embodies the appeals and virtues of a social insurance-based Medicare program for all or a 
general-revenue based single payer system. In practice, however, the states now are probably too 
heavily entrenched in health policy and too powerful and insistent a political presence to be 
pushed to the sidelines. For this and other reasons, Medicaid may well be a more plausible 
foundation for reform than is Medicare. (Brown and Sparer,2003). If so, the central reform 
challenge is to reconcile subnational variation and discretion with a national set of rules that 




 Though it is not the sole focus of federal-state relations in the health sphere, Medicaid is 
certainly the most prominent one, and it therefore offers an especially helpful entry into the 
intergovernmental complexities a reformed system will face. Created in 1965 as a program of 
“welfare medicine” principally for mothers and children on public assistance, Medicaid has 
steadily added beneficiaries and services and now covers (with the State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program) around 60 million Americans on an annual budget of more than $350 billion. 
Boiled down to basics, the federal-state challenges in the program revolve around ten main 
issues. 
1.  Beneficiary Categories. In the course of a “gradual and relentless extension” ( Smith 
and Moore, 2008,p.181), Medicaid has come to cover not only poor mothers and children but 
also the aged, blind, and disabled; many of the mentally ill and mentally retarded ( the program 
is the nation’s most important payer for mental health services); indigent Medicare beneficiaries 
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who qualify “dually” for Medicaid ; some of the temporarily unemployed; victims of intermittent 
disasters ( for instance Hurricane Katrina); and , not least important, Americans whose incomes 
and medical conditions qualify them for long-term care, an extremely costly commitment that 
the states have at intervals explored “swapping” to the feds in exchange for assuming other 
functions. Who “deserves” Medicaid coverage has been a continual subject of debate in the 
program, which has seen ever more organized groups and policy entrepreneurs in and out of 
Congress seize political opportunities that get benefits for “their” populations ensconced in some 
corner of the statute. 
2.  Income Thresholds. Medicaid’s enrollment has grown not only by the addition of new 
groups but also by incremental elevation of income limits on eligibility. In both Medicaid and 
SCHIP states can opt to exceed federally prescribed income thresholds. What the upper federal 
limits should be for what groups and how far the feds should agree to match the Medicaid 
spending of states that want to go farther are contentious issues, as recent skirmishing between 
President Bush and the Democratic Congress over the latter’s proposed expansions in SCHIP 
vividly illustrated.  
3.  Mandated/Optional Benefits. One important federal lever for steering Medicaid in the 
states is to offer them the option of adding new beneficiaries and/or new covered services at their 
federal matching rate. The feds can also make options mandatory if political conditions are ripe, 
and a wave of such transitions—the so-called “Waxman two-step”—in the late 1980s triggered 
protests by governors and their National Governors Association. (Smith and Moore, 2008, 
pp.177-78). 
4.  Delivery Patterns. Feds and states clash and negotiate over the organizational settings 
in which the care for which Medicaid pays is delivered. Examples include: the shift from a fee-
for-service model to managed care (which now enrolls to more than half of Medicaid 
beneficiaries nationwide); the push for “least restrictive” care settings for persons with 
disabilities; the drive to reduce the program’s alleged “institutional bias” by means of home and 
community based treatment loci; battles over what nursing home variant—“intermediate,” 
“extended,” “skilled,” and so on—qualifies for payment under what circumstances; and the 
struggle to formulate and enforce quality standards and patient protections in these and other 
venues.  
5. Safety Net. Medicaid, uninsured, or otherwise disadvantaged patients constitute a 
“disproportionate share” of the patient mix in some hospitals. To ease the fiscal strain, the 
federal government offers the states (and thence the hospitals) special payments, the amounts 
and conditions on receipt of which have grown and contracted over the years to the tune of 
considerable conflict. Some analysts contend that the eternally beleaguered safety net hospitals 
need all the help they can get. Others view them as relics of a superseded system, ripe for 
downsizing, and urge that funds be shifted toward community health centers and other sources of 
primary and outpatient care. Another camp favors shifting dollars from paying for care to 
supplying or improving coverage.  
 6. Fraud and Abuse. Fear that a nontrivial fraction of Medicaid’s billions goes to 
providers (or consumers) who cheat the system has inspired congressional inquiries, agency 
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investigations and closer scrutiny of the financial records of beneficiaries and the billing records 
of providers. The issue lends itself to (literally) arresting headlines, but the cost-effectiveness of 
antifraud efforts is unclear, especially given that anti-fraud and abuse systems occasionally 
succumb to fraud and abuse. (Smith and Moore, 2008, p.141, n. 102) 
 7. Matching Formulas. Since the program’s inception, Medicaid has given all states a 
federal matching percentage of no less than 50 percent, and more ( up to 72 percent) for poorer 
states. Changes in the formula would have large redistributive implications, and so the 
allocations have stayed pretty much frozen in place. (Smith and Moore, 2008, p.239) States, 
however, have annoyed the feds with perennial fiscal improvisations to raise their share of the 
match—for example, by imposing taxes on or securing donations from providers, or contriving 
“intergovernmental transfers” from localities, which then recoup their “losses” with dividends 
from the larger federal funds drawn down. At times the feds have proposed to reduce their 
exposure to “open-ended” matching of state Medicaid spending by converting the program to a 
block grant or by imposing caps on federal matching, but the states and their allies in Congress 
and in the advocacy community have thwarted such initiatives. 
 8. Compliance Enforcement. Because Medicaid covers many complex services for a 
heterogeneous cadre of beneficiaries, feds and states sometimes clash over whether the latter are 
in fact meeting the program’s statutory and regulatory requirements. For example, is the Early 
Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment Program (EPSDT) reaching out adequately to 
beneficiaries and offering treatment for the conditions it finds? (Whether such treatment is 
required when the clinically indicated services are not included in a state's Medicaid plan has 
been a matter of federal-state contention.) Are substance abuse treatments for adolescents in 
Medicaid in fact available and accessible? 
 9. Flexibility and Innovation. As states chafed under federal rules but failed to agree on 
fundamental redesign of the program, governors increasingly argued for greater flexibility to 
innovate within their states. These pleas, especially after welfare reform in 1996 severed the link 
between eligibility for public assistance and for Medicaid, persuaded President (and former 
chafing governor) Bill Clinton to grant more federal waivers that permitted states to make 
changes in coverage (expansions in some states, reduced benefits in others), financing (including 
limited cost sharing), delivery (for instance, ventures in community-based care), and other 
features of the program. President (and former governor) George W. Bush has also been 
generous with federal waivers, leading some observers to worry that such limited national 
uniformity as Medicaid has had is fast dissipating into “fifty different Medicaid programs.” 
 10. Payment Policies. Although the states enjoy broad discretion over how much and 
how they pay providers, the feds sometimes limit their freedom. Contested cases in point include 
the (now repealed) Boren amendment that mandated higher payments to safety net providers, the 
“upper payment limit” that links Medicaid payments to those made by Medicare for some 
services, drug rebates, rules governing payment to nursing homes, and required funding for 
graduate medical education. 
Addressing Diversities 
Health reform might address these intergovernmental diversities and disparities in one of 
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three main ways. First, much of the problem would disappear (or be much mitigated) by a single-
payer, Medicare-for-all plan that took the states largely out of the action. The system would look 
something like, say, France—one dominant “sickness fund” operating in a unitary (non-federal) 
framework. It is sobering to note, however, that roughly 160 million Americans now have health 
coverage that is a good deal less uniform across work sites, let alone states, than is the coverage 
of those on Medicaid or SCHIP. And the 47 million uninsured enjoy no uniformity at all. 
Successful national “standardizing” of this heavily privatized and federalized system would be 
no mean policy feat, and excluding or much downsizing the roles of employers and the states 
would be an equally astounding political coup. Some “minimum adequate” scope for disparities 
(which may or may not constitute objectionable inequities) may be unavoidable. 
Second, if Medicare for all is out of reach politically, reformers could push for Medicaid 
for more, ratcheting up the program’s strong expansionary dynamics. This implies working one’s 
way down the ten-item list reviewed above to identify opportunities for cost-effective and 
politically palatable extensions of Medicaid coverage. For instance, Medicaid for all lower-
income children and/or for more working, lower income adults? “Lower-income” defined how? 
What happens to long-term care? Optional coverage for some groups at federal matching rates, 
or more national mandates? Is managed care to be the, or a, vehicle of choice? Should the feds 
mandate the use of, and set standards for, electronic medical records and kindred managerial 
advances? Will more money go to safety net hospitals, community health centers, or perhaps to 
coverage instead of (directly to) providers of care? How much more fraud and abuse (and efforts 
to deter and detect them) does Medicaid for more imply? Will the federal matching formula for 
the states change? Will special programs such as EPSDT be preserved, and if so, on what terms? 
How much flexibility will be granted to individual states, and on what terms (Waivers? Making 
the program “more like SCHIP,” as some governors prefer?) How and how much will providers 
(expected to deliver accessible care of good quality to an expanded Medicaid clientele) be paid? 
The policy issues and political conflicts that haunt Medicaid today would grow along with the 
program’s enrollment. More of the same battling within political trenches inside the beltway and 
state capitols may seem a pitiful and unworthy model of reform, but it may be the best the U.S. 
system can do, and if perchance it were done in a more liberal political environment after the 
elections of November 2008, this strategy might make a more than marginal dent in the ranks of 
the uninsured. 
Third, reformers might seek to reconcile national consistency with subnational ( and 
private sector) diversity by taking a cue from Canada and promulgating a set of general 
standards/principles/criteria the states must meet in order to qualify for their share of federal 
matching funds. These standards would be broader and less constraining than those of a fully-
national system, but they would require no small measure of averaging among current state 
practices and designing them would be easier said than done.          
Pessimists who fear that such a project is beyond the capacity of U.S. government to 
master may well be right, but before dismissing it as doomed a priori, critics might pause to note 
that other Western nations with federal systems have achieved affordable universal coverage 
while striking a reasonably serviceable and stable intergovernmental balance that addresses 
health policy conundrums not so dissimilar from those Americans confront. The workings of 
federalist improvisations elsewhere might therefore have something to say to U.S. reformers. 
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Health Policy and Foreign Federalism 
Like the United States, most Western societies are perpetually in process of adjusting 
relations between central and subnational governments or regional units in the health sphere. 
France, for example, is a unitary , not federal, system, but looks to Regional Hospital Agencies, 
created a decade ago, to help design and implement changes in local hospital markets. The 
sharing of authority and spending between the national government in Rome and local and 
regional “units” and “enterprises” has held center stage in Italy’s health policies since the nation 
scrapped its social insurance system and adopted a national health service model in 1978. In 
nations whose constitutions grant formal powers to subnational governments, negotiations 
between these and the center over which level should do and fund what in the health system are 
basic parts of the policy furniture.  
One European federation– Switzerland– ranks second only to the United States in health 
spending as a per cent of GDP and per capita. Two others—Canada and Germany—generally vie 
for third place on the spending charts. That these four federal nations finance health care 
differently– Canada has a single payer system, Germany a social insurance regime, Switzerland a 
variant on so-called consumer driven health care, and the United States a hodge-podge of 
private, public and safety net arrangements–may even suggest, notwithstanding that correlation 
is not causation, that federalism itself works to push health costs upward. A quick review of the 
Canadian, German, and Swiss systems pinpoints some challenges and options for U.S. reformers.  
 
Canada 
If, as some argue, “most similar” systems are the  best sources of useable policy lessons 
for national counterparts, then Canada , which shares a border, a language, and important 
historical and institutional similarities with the United States, is the first ( and perhaps last and 
only) place U.S. health reformers ought to canvas. Macro similarities aside, moreover, the 
Canadian and U.S. health systems exhibit intriguing variations on two key health policy themes. 
First, whereas the U.S. constitution leaves ambiguous how “states’ rights” may constrain federal 
health initiatives, Canada’s explicitly assigns health matters to the provinces. Second, the U.S. 
and Canadian health systems looked very similar for much of the 20th century—until the 1970s 
(late in the game by cross-national standards), when the adoption of Canada’s version of 
Medicare put the two nations on divergent strategic paths.  
Provincial debates about public health ( especially hospital) insurance commenced 
around the time of World War I and, particularly in British Columbia and Alberta, moved on and 
off their policy agendas in the 1930s. (Taylor, 1990, chap. 3) Creation of a federal 
Interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Health Insurance in 1942 centralized and intensified 
these debates, but negotiations between the central (formerly known as “dominion”) government 
and the provinces ran aground and adjourned in 1946. The stalemate first broke when 
Saskatchewan moved in 1947 to create a provincial hospital insurance program. By the end of 
1950 four of the ten provinces had broad or near-universal programs of hospital coverage, and 
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the federal government came under rising pressure to create the fiscal conditions (that is, put up 
the money) that would induce the remaining provinces to consent to enter a new national 
program.  
The Canadian debate of 1956-57 rings familiarly to American ears fifty years later: 
It was too much, it was too little, it was too soon, it was overdue, it drained the 
federal treasury, it did not offer enough to the provinces, it was the road to 
socialism, it was the beginning of a new day, it would not represent any additional 
expenditure, it would bankrupt the nation. (Taylor, 1990, 92) 
Then, in a decidedly un-American denouement, Canada’s parliament set aside opposition by the 
insurance industry and chambers of commerce and the lack of endorsement of the Canadian 
Medical Association and passed the Hospital Insurance Act unanimously in both houses in 
1957.(Taylor, 1990, 92-93) A parliamentary political structure evidently does matter: national 
and provincial prime ministers weighed their options and took their time before endorsing health 
insurance breakthroughs in their bailiwicks, but once they resolved to make them happen party 
unity carried the day.  
Four years later, Saskatchewan launched a bigger battle by adding provincial coverage 
for physician services, an innovation that triggered a bitter ( and finally unsuccessful) 
physicians’ strike, but also caught the eye of other provinces which ( again) adopted similar 
measures and sought national funds to help pay for them. This prospect called in question the 
economic future of existing private, voluntary and medical society-sponsored insurance plans, so 
insurance and physician organizations lobbied hard for means-tested benefits in any national 
plan and urged that a national commission be formed to explore the issue and (presumably) 
confirm the wisdom of their wishes. As it happened the report of the Royal Commission on 
Health Services “astounded” (Tuohy,1999, 53) this coalition in 1964 by recommending  that 
public (provincial and central) funds should go directly to pay for care, not for income-scaled 
subsidies to help citizens meet the cost of private health insurance premiums. This decision, 
which seems to have gone down politically with remarkable ease, reflected both a principled 
distaste for private insurance and fiscal pragmatism– income-related subsidies not only 
introduced an inequitable two-tieredness into the system but also were costly and 
administratively cumbersome. (Taylor 1990, 139; Tuohy,1999, 55)After the Medical Care 
Insurance Act passed in 1966  private insurers could not sell coverage that duplicated the 
contents of the “single payer” program and were thus consigned to offering extra 
(“supplementary”) benefits– outpatient prescription drugs and long-term care , for example.(In 
Canada supplementary coverage is largely employer based, while funding for the public plan 
comes mainly from personal, sales, and corporate taxes at the national level and in combinations 
and at rates that vary among provinces.)   
Despite the singularity of public payment in Canada, the system is often characterized as 
ten provincial (and three territorial) systems that differ on many counts. What keeps order amid 
this potential chaos is a list of five “criteria” (also sometimes called “principles,” “conditions,” 
and “standards”) the national government requires the provinces to honor as a condition of 
receipt of its money.(As a constitutional matter, it lacks the power to mandate them outright but 
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can attach them as strings to grants.)As set out in the Canada Health Act of 1984, the criteria 
declare that provincial health programs must secure: comprehensiveness ( medically necessary 
physician and hospital services must be covered); universality ( the whole provincial population 
must be covered); accessibility (physicians may not engage in extra billing and hospitals may not 
impose user charges); portability ( Canadians moving to or traveling in other provinces must be 
covered by their province of residence); and public administration ( provinces cannot delegate 
management of their health plans to for- profit entities).  
Contemplation of 13 subnational health systems bonded serenely by five general 
principles embodied in eight pages of national legislation may sooth the frayed sensibilities of 
U.S. reformers, but the evolution of the Canadian system has been conspicuously conflictual all 
along the way. As noted above, hospital insurance was decades in the making, and the addition 
of coverage for physicians’ services sparked quite a brawl. Once Canada’s version of Medicare 
was intact, the provincial and central governments began (and have continued) to clash earnestly 
and often over which levels will pay how much and how for the health system. Initial 
arrangements, which had the central government sharing a percentage of provincial health costs 
left the former upset about its growing share of provincial “overruns” and the latter fuming about 
nitpicking federal audits and rulings. In 1977 cost sharing gave way to “Established Program 
Financing,” which entailed block grants and the yielding of federal “tax points” in combinations 
that complicated the disentangling of provincial from federal funding streams. Through much of 
the 1990s economic growth slowed and the feds retrenched. In 1990-91, federal transfers 
amounted to 33 percent of provincial/territorial health spending, but by 1999/2000 the shares had 
shifted to 28 percent and 72 percent respectively (Marchildon, 2005, 45.)The provinces bewailed 
betrayal, the providers deplored under investment in the health sector, and the public’s 
satisfaction with the system, hitherto among the highest in Western nations, began to erode. 
Political leaders got the message, and when the economy revived, so too did federal health care 
contributions, which in 2005-2006 stood at 35 percent federal and 64 percent 
provincial/territorial. (Marchildon,2005, 45). Not all was forgiven, however. The renewed 
federal largesse in 2000 and after generated “considerable irritation from provincial governments 
who saw it [the federal government] as trying to gain credit for re-entering an area from which it 
had withdrawn in an antisocial manner.”  (Greer, 2004, 218) A survey of 2003 found that only 
42 percent of respondents affirmed that the feds and provinces worked well together. (France, 
2005, 40) And throughout this fiscal fracas the provinces have been devolving authority in the 
hospital sector to new regional and community boards that could admirably fuse planning with 
local control or could, as Jonathan Lomas (1997,821) observes, become “sponges for local 
discontent.”   
All the same, by contrast to the U.S., Great Britain, and various Continental nations that 
perpetually ponder “systemic” reforms, the Canadian system has been and remains, as Carolyn 
Tuohy notes, impressively stable. Evidently intergovernmental marriages, like the 
nongovernmental kind, can be, as Greer (2005, 220) writes of the Canadian system, “petty in the 
moment,” but “productive overall.” The frictions the system faces are, however, surely more 
than momentary and arguably more than petty.  Allegations by American critics that the 
Canadian system is one long waiting list widely miss the mark, but such lists (sometimes called 
the system’s “Achilles heel”) do sometimes accumulate in some provinces for some services, 
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leading providers, the media, and consumer groups to complain that the system so egregiously 
under invests in health care facilities and personnel that citizens are sometimes driven to 
distraction—or over the U.S. border for care!  Indeed a recent court decision in Quebec that 
excessive waiting jeopardizes the accessible care the system promises could open the door to the 
private competition Canada has so far refused to admit .Meanwhile, even as the right deplores 
the absence of private competitors in the public insurance plan, the left denounces the advent of 
groups of private physicians (some with corporate ties in the United States) on the supply side. 
And of course the absence of a national requirement that provincial plans fund outpatient 
prescription drugs and home health care (among other omissions) continues to vex critics who 
point out the rising (and often out of pocket) costs of such services to the public and the 
disparities that ensue when coverage is left to provincial discretion.  
Another camp of critics complains that the system’s accommodative and “collegial” 
(Tuohy, 1999) catering to private practitioners ( mostly independent and paid fee for service, 
which constitutes 83 percent of physician revenue) and hospitals ( mainly private, non-profit and 
paid by global budgets) generates excessive use of services, forecloses opportunities for 
integration and coordination, and deserves a heavy dose of the managed care (and/or managed 
competition) in which Canada has to date shown little interest. These aggravations all flow in 
some measure from the system’s costs, which though well below those of the U.S., stand high 
enough and rise fast enough perpetually to distress Canadian leaders. 
What insights might the U.S. take from the success (for so it is on any reasonable 
definition or measure) of Canada’s system? It is tantalizing to picture a federal “compact” in 
which the U.S. states, like the Canadian provinces, agree to a fund-sharing formula accompanied 
by five ( or however many) criteria that assure to all citizens accessible, comprehensive, 
portable, properly managed health services. The Canadian case also shines light on some 
possible mine fields along the way, however. In the political run up to Medicare, Canadian 
employers did not cling on principle to health insurance as a fringe benefit for workers or 
ideologically bash a “big government takeover” of the health sector. Canadian physicians remain 
independent private practitioners subject to little clinical monitoring or interference, but 
“collegiality” is not capitulation by the State: they agree collectively to negotiate their fees with 
provincial ministries of health and, overall, earn less than U.S. counterparts. And, perhaps  most 
important, Canada’s federal authorities gave private insurers a swift shove to the sidelines of the 
system and have ( so far) insisted that they stay there. For all the grumbling about the distasteful 




The German health care system, quite the opposite of single payer, has been since its 
creation by Otto von Bismark in 1883 a social insurance model, reliant in 1910 on 23,354 
occupation-based sickness funds (Leichter, 1979, 124), a universe that declined to about 1,000 
by 1990, and that now contains roughly 250 funds, competing and open to all customers, 
wherever employed. The system draws funds mainly from payroll taxes shared half and half by 
 12
worker and employer. This financing method has much-noticed limitations: it allegedly 
discourages the formation and expansion of businesses, is at the mercy of the dependency ratio  
(given Germany’s low birth rates a shrinking number of workers must sustain benefits for a 
growing number of beneficiaries over time), and it fails to tap “modern” sources of wealth such 
as real estate and stock holdings. Germany, therefore, has very recently begun emulating France 
by infusing more general revenues into the health accounts, thus blurring the distinction between 
Beveridge and Bismarck models. The latest round of German reforms also aims to fill a small 
but important gap in the fabric of universal coverage--200,000 self-employed residents who were 
not hitherto eligible for the statutory regime. 
 The German constitution (Basic Law of 1949) assigns to Germany’s federal government 
responsibility for designing the benefits, eligibility, funding, and payment rules for the public 
health insurance system. The Länder (states), which since unification in 1990 number 16, are in 
charge of planning, building, licensing, and monitoring hospitals.(About half of Germany’s acute 
care beds are in public hospitals owned by the Länder; roughly 35 percent are in nonprofit 
hospitals often run by religious orders; and 15 percent are in for profit facilities. Hospital 
physicians are generally salaried, whereas their community counterparts are paid mostly fee for 
service.) The hospitals of course depend on funds from the public insurance system, so the 
federal and land levels share authority for determining hospitals rates and payments. 
(Altenstetter, 1999, 66) 
German health care policy honors what Altenstetter and Busse (2005,125,138) call the 
three S’s: solidarity, subsidiarity, and self-governance. Solidarity—universal and equitable 
coverage and the cross-subsidies required to sustain these goals—falls largely to national policy. 
Subsidiarity—the making and running of policy should be entrusted to local units insofar as 
possible—honors the turf of the Länder, which themselves embody strong regional identities that 
antedate the creation of the German nation in 1871 and have by no means disappeared. 
(Altenstetter, 1999, 54, 81, n.3) Self-governance adds a distinctively German element to the 
equation—delegation (within a framework of federal and Land rules) of many decisions to 
national and regional (Land-based) associations of sickness funds and associations of sickness 
fund physicians, which bargain over matters of mutual interest, especially the monetary 
coefficients of medical procedures listed in fee schedules. The result, wrote William Glaser 
(1978, 110, 109) some years ago, is “national uniformity with provincial flexibility,” a model for 
Americans of how “government can enact the rules and then leave the doctors and sick funds to 
carry out the program with little government interference.” More recently, Altenstetter and Busse 
(2005, 124-125) characterize the German state (presumably both the federal and Land levels) as 
“regulator, facilitator, and enabler to the parties in corporate self-governance.” 
Admirers of the German system laud its “cooperative federalism,” under which the 
national government makes policy and the lander and the national and land-based corporatist 
associations of sickness funds and providers implement it. Critics of German federalism 
complain, however, that it can make the price of cooperation unacceptably high. The lander have 
a  large hand in making as well as implementing policy because they are constituent units of the 
upper house of the German parliament, the Bundesrat. Legislative proposals go first for debate to 
this body, which can withhold approval from some statutory categories. A majority party at the 
head of the federal government may encounter an opposition majority (or no clear party 
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majority) in the Bundesrat, which can stymie legislation and occasionally oblige federal 
ministers to make policy via “federal ordinances.” 
These structural arrangements give voice to the lander: the views of land-level political 
leaders and bureaucrats are “known from the very beginning of the federal legislative process.” 
They also prompt critics to lament that the lander are a “cartel” and a “decision trap.” 
(Altenstetter and Busse, 2005, 129-30; Altenstetter, 1999, 70-71) The Länder successfully 
“vetoed” plans to put tougher controls on spending for drugs and physician salaries in 1999 
(Altenstetter and Busse, 2005, 132), have been slow to advance national policies favoring closer 
integration between the community and hospitals sectors of care (Altenstetter,1999, 61) and, 
seeking to maintain a “regionalized landscape” of sickness funds, have lately resisted proposals 
to consolidate and thus reduce the number of funds. (Bode, 2006, 202)  
Since enacting in 1993 the legislation that gave its population a choice among sickness 
funds, Germany has flirted with managed competition, a development that piqued the interest of 
U.S. would-be reformers in the Clinton years. The advent of competition ushered in predictable 
protections– funds, for example, cannot turn away applicants or tailor premiums to health 
conditions and are compensated for the risk profiles with which they end up by risk-adjusted 
payments determined by a federal formula– and equally predictable debates– for instance, do the 
risk adjustment mechanisms “work”? Do the competing sickness funds think they work fairly? 
Might the new competitive ethos not insidiously undercut solidarity in practice? (For an 
excellent and uncommonly full discussion of techniques of informal risk selection, see Bode, 
2006, pages 193-194.) Moreover, although the (limited) price competition the scheme permits 
has triggered some (limited) switching among funds, the system’s de facto unwillingness to 
break the longstanding norm that any German physician can treat any member of the statutory 
plan leaves the selective contracting that is now officially permissible little practiced, at least to 
date. In Germany, then, managed competition comes unaccompanied by “managed care”– the 
reverse of the American picture. (Brown and Amelung, 1999)  
The German system holds several “lessons” for the U.S. First, if U.S. employers were to 
accept mandatory contributions to the coverage of workers and citizens more broadly—a very 
big “if”—one would expect vigorous complaining by them and their ideological allies about 
damage to economic growth and the unfitness of social insurance financing in modern times. 
This implies that a Medicare program continually alleged to teeter near bankruptcy may be hard 
to expand “for all” and that general revenues (and the taxes that supply them) will be a crucial 
and growing component of universal coverage. Second, although German physicians (fee-for 
service in the ambulatory sector, salaried in hospitals) retain wide clinical freedom, the collective 
bargaining with associations of sickness funds that determine their incomes has led to discontent 
and, of late, strikes, unheard of in the past. Third, the U.S. too could avert the “big government” 
inherent in a single payer system–so long as its health insurance firms morphed into health 
insurance institutions ( private bodies with a public charter, as the Germans have it) competition 
among which would be governed by  firm rules that, among other things, proscribe preferred risk 
selection. Fourth, a pervading and sometimes messy federalism can obstruct health reform in 
Germany, as in the U.S., but is less likely to do so if, as in Germany, universal and equitable 
health coverage is an undisputed duty of the national government and the values of subsidiarity 
(“government close to the people”) and self-governance are not allowed to trump solidarity. The 
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uses and limits of federalism in health policy are, in short, mightily context dependent.  
 
Switzerland 
 The Swiss system is insurance based (unlike Canada), but the insurance is funded not 
from the payrolls of workers and firms (as in Germany) but rather from the checkbooks of 
individual citizen/consumers, who since 1996 have been mandated to buy coverage. The Swiss 
constitution, like Canada’s, officially vests power over health affairs mainly in subnational units, 
and like Canada’s, the Swiss system is highly decentralized. This nation roughly the size of 
Maryland is sometimes said to have 26 different (cantonal) health systems. Like the United 
States, the Swiss political system bristles with veto points– in this case, requirements that major 
legislation be approved in popular referenda. (A fine account of Swiss health politics through the 
late 1980s is Immergut, 1992, chap. 4.) These high hurdles for system “overhauls,” breached 
only in 1911 and 1996, have, as in the U.S., brought down promising reform proposals, which 
then linger on the agenda awaiting another try on a better day. 
 Until very recently scholarly accounts of cross-national health policy seldom took note 
of Switzerland. That system is now enjoying at least 15 minutes of fame because it combines 
three  features of great interest to American reformers, namely, an individual mandate, 
“consumer driven” insurance (Herzlinger and Parsa-Parsi, 2004), and not inconsiderable 
discretion for and diversity among the cantons. Less frequently remarked is the framework of 
national rules that govern the system.  Before 1996, health insurers were allowed to tailor 
premiums to risks, but now, in an explicit affirmation of solidarity, the national government 
requires all insurers to offer a basic package of benefits, to set community rates, and to take all 
applicants. (Medical exams and differential premiums are allowed, however, in supplemental 
insurance contracts.) That government  proscribes for-profit insurance firms, mandates and 
defines a risk adjustment formula to level the playing field among insurers, reviews the 
compliance of insurers with national law, and audits (and can reduce) their proposed rates 
(European Observatory on Health Care Systems, 2000, 29). It also requires that the cantons 
define eligibility and levels for related premiums for consumers who could not otherwise afford 
what is offered in their canton  (about a third of the population is subsidized, and cantonal 
policies vary considerably), precludes selective contracting among providers by insurers (except 
by managed care plans), and sets national fee schedules for payments to providers, the monetary 
value of which is negotiated in each canton by associations of insurers and associations of 
physicians and “endorsed” by the cantonal government.  (European Observatory on Health Care 
Systems, 2000, 15) Swiss citizens do indeed get to choose among insurance plans that compete 
on price (premiums, size of deductibles, and copayments), choice of provider  (HMO and other 
managed care variants are available, though their penetration is low so far), and service 
amenities ( administrative efficiency, quick handling of queries on the telephone, and so on). 
But, as noted above, the public—national—rules of the insurance game are many and stringent.  
Official cantonal duties, as in Germany, center mainly on the construction, running, and 
(partial) funding of hospitals (249 of which were publically owned or subsidized and 143 private 
in 1999) (Herzlinger and Parsa-Parsi,2004, 1215); planning and delivering public health 
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services; and overseeing negotiations on prices between insurers and physicians. The number 
and type of insurance plans differs among cantons, as also of course does the distribution of 
physicians, hospitals, and other resources. 
Some key features of the Swiss system are but a decade old ( including the individual  
mandate and the shift from employer-based to consumer- driven funding), and thoughtful Swiss 
would remind American enthusiasts that this reformed system remains a work in progress. As in 
the U.S. ( and Canada and Germany) Swiss policymakers are distressed that health costs are so 
high  (according to the latest OECD data, in 2005 the nation spent 11.6 percent of GDP and 
$4,177 per capita on health care, second only to the U.S. in relation GDP, and, for per capita 
spending, third behind the U.S. and Norway).Moreover, out of pocket costs are high (in 2002 in 
Switzerland these ran to $1,149 per capita, as contrasted with $302 in Germany and $281 in 
France) (de Jong and Mosca, 2006, 5) and cantonal spending on health services ranges widely—
from $2,452 per capita in the canton of Geneva in 2002 to $1,103 in Appenzell-Innerrhoden) 
(deJong and Mosca, 2006, 8)  
Analysts round up the usual suspects: Switzerland has the highest hospital density and 
highest concentration of high-tech equipment in Europe (European  Observatory on Health Care 
Systems,2000, 35), a high physician-to-population ratio, an abundance of specialists, high 
expenses for chronic care, restrictions on selective contracting, too little managed care, an 
expanding list of mandated benefits, and so on. Some critics charge that efforts to boost 
efficiency are damaging equity. Insurers cannot legally turn away high-risk applicants but they 
can and allegedly do discourage them informally, partly because the national risk-adjustment 
formula is widely agreed to need work. The financing system is said to be regressive, inflicting 
on Swiss citizens very high out of pocket payments that (incidentally and ironically) have 
demonstrably failed to curb the rise of spending. Consumer choice among competing insurers 
has triggered “little switching . . . and little price convergence.” Indeed between 1996-2000, rates 
of switching among insurers, already low, declined further, suggesting that amid so many 
choices consumers find themselves unable to “make an effective selection.” (De jong and Mosca 
2006, 12; quoting Frank and Lamirand) The premium subsidies for the less well-off do not keep 
pace with the costs of coverage– perhaps because this lag may encourage membership in 
managed care plans, on which some policymakers pin hopes for cost containment. Finally, 
planning for the number and distribution of hospitals and physicians and for the prevention of 
illness and promotion of health are said to suffer from lack of coordination among the cantons.  
Could the U.S. “do” the Swiss system? It could indeed IF it were willing to couple an 
individual mandate with a long list of central constraints on health insurers, craft public subsidies 
that offset the regressive effects of a shift in funding from employer-based to consumer-driven 
insurance, create fee schedules as a basis for bargaining with the medical profession over 
payments, and give states a large say about the size and character of the hospital system, among 
other reforms. Simply to scan the list is to see that the present and potential goodness of fit 
between the Swiss and U.S. systems is much more problematic than surface inspection suggests.  
Conclusions 
The three federal systems scanned here in search of lessons for the U.S. have distinct 
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financing approaches (single-payer in Canada, social insurance supplemented by general 
revenues in Germany, “consumer driven” in Switzerland), but all three in their various fashions 
honor the adage that one must first centralize policy before one can effectively decentralize it. 
All have achieved universal coverage by including everyone (Canada) or permitting (Germany) 
or requiring (Switzerland) everyone to join the system. None grants autonomy to business in the 
offering and funding of coverage: in Canada business supports the health system (and the rest of 
the public sector’s budget) via general corporate taxes, in Germany employers have long been 
obliged by federal law to contribute 50/50 with workers into social insurance funds, and 
Switzerland’s 1996 reform largely took business out of the health financing picture (employer 
contributions now come only to 6 percent of the funds in the system). 
In all three nations physicians are largely independent, fee-for-service “private” 
practitioners whose fees are set by means of bargaining over nationally- designed fee schedules 
between their associations and either provincial authorities ( Canada) or associations of insurers ( 
Germany and Switzerland) In none are managed care organizations an important source of 
employment for physicians. In all three subnational discretion applies mostly to hospitals, in the 
planning, construction and funding of which the provinces, lander, and cantons play large roles. 
All three complain of excessive ( albeit declining) hospital beds, admissions, and lengths of stay; 
decry lack of integration between the ambulatory and inpatient sectors; and intimate that the 
power of subnational units over “their” hospitals is an obstacle to integration and streamlining. 
All three laud the promise of public health and health promotion to improve the health of their 
populations and (potentially) the fiscal picture of the health systems, and all three offer mea 
culpas for not doing more on this score. All three say ( and may even believe) that advances in 
information technology, evidence based medicine, and health technology assessment will 
improve their systems in numberless ways.  
One of the three, Canada, contemplated retaining insurance firms whose premiums would 
be offset by income-related public subsidies, concluded that the financial and administrative 
costs of doing so were too high, and summarily relegated insurers to a market strictly 
supplementary to the public single payer plan. The other two have competing sickness funds but 
constrain their rates, proscribe risk selection, forbid profit making by firms, and mandate 
benefits. All three (though Canada less so) rehearse the virtues of managed care, but none (yet) 
shows much taste for selective contracting , which would trigger pitched battles with physicians 
long accustomed to treating any patient who selects them. 
For the U.S. the good news is that well-working (albeit costly) systems of universal 
coverage are eminently compatible with federal systems of government. The bad (at least 
disconcerting) news is that emulation of their achievements in the U.S. would require several 
major departures from its current system. The minimum workable package would include: 
central rules of the game such as Canada’s five principles that govern fund sharing between the 
central government and the provinces; the elevation of health coverage from a fringe benefit of 
employment to an entitlement of citizens, thus telling business in effect to pay its fair share into 
national and/or state budgets and then butt out; requirements that physicians accept ( hence 
presumably agree to bargain collectively over) fees set by subnational payers, insurance 
institutions, or some combination of government and insurers; and constraints on or elimination 
of business practices now central to profit or revenue-maximizing firms in a health insurance 
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“industry” unique among Western nations. Such provisions make sense if the U.S. decides that 
universality, equity, and solidarity should be guiding principles of health reform. Within such a 
context, federalism can be part of orderly arrangements in which subnational units sometimes 
lead, sometimes follow, and sometimes get out of the way. But refiguring federalism is no 
reform panacea. The health policy records of other nations have much to say to American 
reformers, but whether these latter care, and can afford politically, to listen is an open question. 
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